In this paper we construct a ranking of states based on their proclivity to inspect facilities for environmental compliance. Our measure utilizes state-level inspections data supplied by the US Environmental Protection Agency. After developing our ranking, we use it to predict state-level growth in manufacturing establishments. In doing so, we find support for the notion that enforcement intensity adversely impacts such growth. Our results offer insight into why existing studies that examine the impact of environmental regulation on location and growth produce inconsistent results. 
Introduction
Does the enforcement of environmental regulations help or hinder the growth of a state's manufacturing base? There are two opposing responses to this question. Of these, the most traditional response is that environmental regulations, and their enforcement, tend to hinder growth. Compliance with regulations can be burdensome and costly, thus, when firms choose a manufacturing location they will opt for locales in which they expect to face less regulation and enforcement. The opposing view suggests that states with strict regulations and strict regulatory enforcement should see positive growth in their manufacturing base. This view is based on two arguments. First, in comparison with labor and manufacturing costs, environmental compliance costs are relatively small. Second, valued employees care about quality of life issues, of which the local environment is an important component. This view suggests that the benefits of locating in states with stricter environmental enforcement might outweigh the costs.
In this paper we attempt to directly test these two contrasting predictions using state-level data on regulatory enforcement and the growth in manufacturing establishments.
2 An understanding of whether the level of environmental enforcement helps or hinders manufacturing growth is important to a number of constituencies. First, environmental economists are interested in answering this question because it can provide important insights into how corporations manage the costs and benefits of environmental compliance. Second, businesses, whether polluting or not, wish to know 2 It is important to emphasize that we are focusing on the siting of new manufacturing establishments within states in our growth regression analysis as opposed to general manufacturing growth from the expansion of employment in both new as well as existing facilities. This is in deference to concerns that sufficiently strict environmental enforcement may cause plant closings and relocations to other states with more lax environmental enforcement (see, e.g., Gray, 1997) . While this was the focus of the present study, a broader measure of growth would clearly be worth considering in subsequent research.
whether legislative and regulatory activities help or harm an area's manufacturing base since, in many instances, manufacturing is a basic (export-oriented) industry integral to the overall sustainability and growth of a region's economy. Finally, state regulators and legislators need to know whether, and to what extent, their efforts help or harm manufacturing growth in order to optimize regulatory enforcement.
In addition to offering insights into these public policy questions, this study also addresses a gap in the literature on economic growth and environmental regulation that is important to environmental economists and policy makers alike. Barro (1991) developed a model of economic growth that suggested an econometric procedure that could be used to explain differences in economic growth among nations. Several authors have used
Barro's approach to attempt to explain differences in economic growth among states. A few papers have used measures of environmental quality and legislation, along with other economic variables, to explain economic growth (e.g., Goetz, Ready, and Stone, 1996; Polzin, 2001 federal regulations apply to all states, their impact on the manufacturing base depends on the degree to which they are enforced, which varies widely across states. Finally, policies can and do change over time. Since companies are likely to care less about regulatory policy changes and more about the degree and rigor with which policies are enforced, a measure of enforcement is desirable. Our methodology addresses these concerns by using a measure of environmental inspection proclivity, at the state level, based on three major federal environmental acts.
In constructing this measure, we adopt a procedure employed by List and McHone (2000) . This procedure uses econometric techniques to purge from a raw measure of inspection intensity (based on inspection counts) systematic cross-sectional and time-varying effects. In the end we obtain a time-invariant measure of inspection proclivities (that is, a measure of the intrinsic importance of environmental protection) unique to each state. Based on this measure, we construct a state ranking of inspection proclivity. Adopting the nomenclature of List and McHone (2000) , we refer to this as a "conditional ranking", as opposed to an "unconditional ranking" based solely on the raw inspections data.
Controlling for cross-sectional variation is beneficial since certain industries located in only a few states may simply require more inspection activity given the nature of production. Some industries, for instance, are deemed "high priority" industries by the However, as an indicator of enforcement proclivity this construction is indirect at best and possibly inaccurate since there may be other reasons for firms to invest in pollution abatement other than compliance (see, e.g. Lyon and Maxwell, 2004, and Segerson and Li, 2000 for detailed discussions of "voluntary" or "strategic" motivations for pollution abatement).
As noted above, List and McHone (2000) also construct a state ranking of environmental output by state. As a measure of air quality the ranking is very useful.
However, our interest is in measuring a state's proclivity to enforce existing environmental regulations. Therefore, a different dataset is required. For instance, a state may have better air quality than others simply because the composition of the state's economy is dominated by low-polluting industries, having very little to do with the relative importance the state places on environmental enforcement. Fortunately, data on inspections do exist. We can use this data to construct a direct measure of enforcement proclivity. As we will see, our ranking based on inspections data generates different rankings than both Henderson (1994) and List and McHone (2000) .
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the raw, or unconditional, inspections data and its characteristics. In sections 3 and 4 we discuss the need and procedure for developing a conditional ranking in more detail and the resulting econometric results. In section 5 we apply our conditional ranking to an analysis of determinants of manufacturing establishment growth. In section 6 we conclude.
An Unconditional Ranking of Inspections
The primary goal in this study is to ascertain, through as direct a measure as possible, a state's proclivity toward enforcement of environmental regulations. To this end we focus principally on inspection behavior. 5 We obtained data on inspections conducted by states for the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) compliance between 1992 and 1998, from the US EPA's Office of Environmental Compliance and Assistance (OECA). 6 To measure the intensity of inspection activity, we borrowed a concept from the economic geography and regional science literatures, and constructed a "location quotient" (LQ) for each state.
Specifically, we consider the calculation of a location quotient for state inspections per facility, LQIN, calculated as follows:
where IN is the number of inspections and FAC is the number of facilities subject to inspections. 7 Table 1 In principal one could use this measure, or a ranking based on it, to explain differences in the growth of manufacturing facilities across states, but this is too simplistic. This measure does not control for potentially important systematic differences among states that may affect inspection intensity, but that have little to do with the true level of enforcement intensity a particular facility may expect to receive. For example, the LQIN measure does not take into account the industry mix of the manufacturing base.
It may be the case that most facilities subject to inspection in, say, New Mexico are 6 The data was made available to us in aggregate. That is, we do not have available CAA inspections separately from either CWA or RCRA inspections. Since our focus is on overall enforcement intensity the breakdown by statute is not of immediate interest. 7 The inspections data are defined on a per facility basis because more inspections will occur where more polluting facilities exist.
inherently less polluting than most facilities in, say, Alabama. This does not mean, however, that a given type of facility (such as an oil refinery) will be inspected less in New Mexico than in Alabama.
Several factors other than industry mix may have similar effects and must be controlled for in order to develop a proper estimate of environmental inspection proclivity. These factors include an industry's historical compliance record in a given state, and the relative importance of the polluting industry or industries to a state's economy. Regulators, as a matter of course, inspect more frequently facilities that have poor environmental records, or those known to produce high levels of pollution (see, e.g. Gray and Deily (1996) , Dion, Lanoie, and Laplante (1998), and Decker (2005) . At the same time, inspectors may shy away from inspecting facilities that are important to a state's economy. Again, however, these concerns will have little to do with the inspection intensity faced by a new facility that may not be crucial to the state's economic base.
Additionally, our conditional ranking of inspection proclivity should control for the influence of the general political attitudes of the population and the government of the state. The rationale for purging the influence of these variables from our measure of environmental inspection intensity is that while they are widely thought to influence regulatory behavior, political attitude may also influence other variables that also might help or hinder the growth of a state's manufacturing sector. For example, political attitudes might lead to stricter or weaker requirements for the granting of construction permits for new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities. Thus, in explaining the growth of a state's manufacturing sector, it may be beneficial to include these political attitude variables as separate regressors in order to avoid collinearity problems.
Construction of the Conditional Ranking
In this section we develop a conditional ranking, based on LQIN, that has been purged of the systematic influences outlined in section 2. To this end, we assembled from a variety of sources a panel dataset that provides information on inspections and other variables across states over the period 1992 to 1998. We then ran fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) regression models on this data.
The FE model is: More complete definitions and explicit construction of the independent variables used in our regression analysis are described in greater detail in this paper's appendix (Table A1) . Our fixed effects model is: 
The independent variables enter equation (2) as location quotients to ensure consistency in the error term. 8 The variable LQENAVG measures the average number of per facility enforcement actions levied over the four years prior to current inspections by states for CAA, CWA and RCRA violations (relative to the number of actions per facility levied at the US level). As with the inspection data, the enforcement data was provided by OECA.
We expect higher relative prior enforcement actions to subsequently prompt more frequent inspections (see, e.g. Harrington, 1988 In addition to pollutant releases, inspectors may consider the level of production as an additional indication of a firm's potential to violate environmental law. As a measure of aggregate production, we utilize the US Department of Commerce's real gross state product (GSP) data. We construct LQGSP to measure overall real gross state product per capita relative to US real gross national product per capita.
Moreover, for reasons stated earlier, we also consider production levels (as measured by industry-level GSP) for the five priority industries identified above as well. 10 The US EPA's Office of Compliance and Enforcement publishes this list annually in its Enforcement and Compliance Accomplishments reports. See http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/reports/planning/results/fy98accomplishment.pdf for details. 11 Industry level gross state production (GSP) data is available from the US Department of Commerce at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp.htm. The reason we focus on industry releases relative to total manufacturing GSP is because during the 1990s the TRI data was collected only for these industries classified as manufacturing sectors.
Each of these LQs measure the share of each industry's GSP to total manufacturing GSP for each state divided by the same share for the nation as a whole.
The prior expectation of each of these variables' marginal effect on LQIN is unclear. While we might expect that greater industrial production generates the potential for greater environmental harm thereby prompting more inspections, it is possible that some of these sectors represent a relatively powerful economic interest within a particular state. To the extent that such industries may have been able to "capture" environmental enforcement officials, it might be the case that the resulting effects of all or some subset of these GSP LQs could have a negative impact on LQIN. Hence, a clear prior expectation is not easily identified.
Other control variables include population density (LQDENSITY), general political attitudes of the population (LQCIT and LQELEC) and elected officials (LQGOV). With respect to population density, we would expect to see greater inspection intensity the greater the concentration of citizens at risk of environmental harm. Political attitudes of a state's citizenry are measured by LQCIT and LQELEC. LQCIT comes from Berry, Ringquest, Fording, and Hanson (1998) and measures the ratio of a state's "citizen political ideology" score to the US average over the period 1990 to 1998. Citizen political ideology is generally thought of as a state's mean position on a liberalconservative continuum primarily based on voting behavior in local, US congressional, and presidential elections. This index is constructed in such a way that the higher the index, the more "liberal" the state (see Berry et al. for details). These indexes don't necessarily give an indication of how politically active state' population is. To measure how politically active state citizens are, we include LQELEC. Because in general US citizens are more active in presidential elections, LQELEC measures the percent of the voting population by state for the presidential elections 1988, 1992 and 1996. We expect each to have a positive effect on LQIN.
LQGOV, again based on Berry, et al. (1998) , is the ratio of a state's "elected public official political ideology" score to the US average. Elected officials' political ideologies can be thought of generally as a state's mean position on a liberal-conservative continuum. But here the scores are based on publicly available voting behavior of these elected officials on a number of issues classified as "liberal" vs. "conservative." This index is constructed in such a way that the higher the index, the more "liberal" the state (see Berry et al. (1998) for details). Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in equation (2) as well as the variables used in our subsequent business formation growth regressions. 
Panel Estimation Results
The FE and RE results are presented in Table 3 . In order to test which model is better suited to the data we ran a Hausman test. We found the Hausman statistic to be 45.96 which, with 17 degrees of freedom, strongly favors the FE model. Moreover, we are explaining about 79 percent of the variation in LQIN and the F-statistic from our model suggests that we can safely reject the null hypothesis that our estimated coefficients on all of our independent variables are jointly equal to zero. 12 Ideally, other important variables would be included in our model, such as number of inspectors employed, or perhaps a measure of state-level environmental budgets. However, we were unable to locate inspector employment data by state. We were, however, able to obtain some data for state-level environmental budgets for the sub-period 1994 to 1998 from the Environmental Council of the States. While this did limit the size of our dataset, we did introduce this variable in several ways (as a share of total state budgets, on a per-capita basis, and as an LQ where state environmental budgets per capita were divided by total state budgets per capita). In each instance the variable proved statistically insignificant and generated poorer overall statistical results. As such we have chosen to present the results without this data. To be sure, there is still merit in pursuing such data extensions. By way of future research, it may be beneficial to survey state environmental agencies to determine the number of inspectors employed.
In the interest of brevity, we will highlight only a few key results from the FE model. First, as evidenced by the significance of LQENAVG, we find that historical noncompliance does statistically impact subsequent inspection intensity. Moreover, the results indicate that in more densely populated states inspection activity is more intensive.
We also find that inspection intensity tends to be greater in states with more politically active residents (as indicated by the significance of the LQELEC and LQCIT variables). As far as specific sectors are concerned, we find that higher relative emissions in pulp and paper plants tend to lead to significant increases in relative inspection activity. Interestingly, results indicate that chemical plants are inspected relatively less intensively, ceteris paribus, which may be indicating the possibility of industrial capture in this sector or the possibility of industry self-regulation measures.
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In terms of the relationship between pollution releases and inspection intensity, there is some evidence that higher TRI releases per GSP prompt more intensive inspection activity in the pulp and paper and chemical manufacturing sectors, ceteris paribus. However, contrary to expectation, we find the higher TRI releases per GSP in the oil refining sector prompt less subsequent inspection intensity. 14 In terms of the resulting conditional state ranking obtained from the FE model presented in Table 4 , we find some significant differences when compared to the unconditional ranking. We find that the four states with the highest inspection proclivity 13 See Lyon and Maxwell (2004) for a detailed study of corporate motivations for self-regulation, including the American Chemistry Council's (formally, the Chemical Manufacturing Association) creation of the self-regulatory Responsible Care program. 14 This counter-intuitive result is certainly troubling and, while it is the case that relative to the other sectors TRI releases in this sector are relatively small, this result may suggest that for this sector, a more refined measure of pollution may be necessary.
are Wyoming, Utah, West Virginia, and Alabama, while the four with the least proclivity are New Jersey, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.
It is worth pointing out some similarities and differences with existing state environmental rankings. For instance, List and McHone's (2000) rankings of states based on air pollution places Wyoming eleventh, a relatively high ranking. That is, Wyoming will tend to have relatively few ozone monitors indicating exceedance of federal air quality regulations. To be sure, there are some striking differences as well. In contrast to our finding that New Jersey has the lowest inspection proclivity, List and McHone (2000) find that New Jersey tended to have the smallest percentage of ozone monitors indicating larger than allowable pollutant releases.
State Environmental Regulatory Attitudes and New Business Formation
The growth model. One application of the state ranking is to test whether or not a state's inspection proclivity impacts the economic landscape of a state. There are a number of studies that have investigated the relationship between plant location, production decisions and environmental regulation.
15 Using state-level data on new manufacturing plant construction, Gray (1997) for instance, found that fewer new plants were built in those states where environmental enforcement was more aggressive. Other studies suggest alternative conclusions. Goetz, Ready, and Stone (1996) , for instance, investigated the impact various measures of state environmental quality have on the growth in state per capita income. Their state environmental policy index (which incorporates 17 policy areas including a number of enforcement policies such as hazardous waste management and groundwater protection plans) was found to have no statistical impact on per capita income growth.
While both studies have substantial merit, there are a number of aspects that, in light of our results so far, deserve some re-consideration. First, Gray's (1997) results treated enforcement, measured as number of inspections, as exogenous and independent of his other model variables, including industry output. However, our results suggest that inspections are indeed endogenous, influenced by, among other variables, industry output. Hence, Gray's (1997) results linking enforcement with plant location may be premature and further investigation is in order. With respect to Goetz, Ready, and Stone (1996) , their results are based on an environmental index measure that embodied a variety of policy variables, not simply enforcement and thus any deference to the enforcement effect on growth was at best indirect.
In this section we apply an economic growth model similar to Goetz, Ready, and Stone, which is largely an adaptation of Barro's (1991) growth study. Rather than focus on employment or income growth directly, more consistent with Gray's analysis, we use new establishment data for the period 1990 to 2000 from the Small Business Administration (SBA). We look at overall growth between 1990 and 2000 for manufacturing establishments and test the impact of our conditional (and unconditional) index on this growth. We then look at growth patterns between 1990 and 2000 for small establishments (generally defined by the SBA as having fewer than 500 employees) and large establishments (500 or more employees).
The empirical model specified is ln ( 2000) ln ( 1990) Table 4 .
Econometric Results. In Table 5 we present the results of the above specification when using INSRANK and INSRANKCOND, respectively. In Table 6 There is some evidence to support the notion that firms are attracted to build new plants in states with more productive workforces and in states with lower poverty rates.
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Importantly, as indicated by the negative and significant impact of INSRANKCOND, we do see that manufacturing establishment growth is slowed in states with more intensive environmental inspection activity, ceteris paribus. While this impact conforms to prior expectation, it is worthwhile to point out that had just the unconditional ranking been employed, we would not have concluded that any impact exits. Nonetheless, once our conditional measure of inspection intensity is constructed, we do find a negative impact on business growth.
It is also interesting to note that, as we see in Table 6 , INSRANKCOND's impact on establishment growth is consistent across size of production facilities. Growth in establishments generating 500 or more jobs is slower in states with a higher inspection proclivity ranking to nearly the same degree as growth in smaller establishments (employing less than 500 people) is retarded. That said, the results do point out some other differences in determinants of manufacturing establishment growth. For instance, smaller facilities tend to be attracted to states with higher productivity levels and lower poverty rates. However, firms tend to build larger facilities in states with a more favorable business tax climate. 17 The statistical significance of PRODUCTIVITYGR and the insignificance of EDUC may be picking up certain unobservable characteristics of the manufacturing establishment data. It may be that most of the establishments constructed are primarily the production and distribution of goods for which an established market exists. Were it possible to distinguish between production and distribution facilities and, say new product development and R&D facilities, EDUC may be a significant determinant of the latter and not of the former.
VI. Conclusion
When utilizing a more direct measure of enforcement to construct a conditional ranking of a state's proclivity towards environmental regulations, we find results that differ from existing rankings that measure such effects indirectly. When applied to the question of whether or not enforcement of existing regulations influences the growth of business establishment formation, we find that our conditional ranking of inspection proclivity does indeed have a significant deterring effect on such growth. Thus, our results generally support the notion that enforcement of environmental regulation hinders a state's manufacturing growth prospects.
There are several directions for future research. First, it may be of interest to conduct a similar analysis of the European Union and compare enforcement proclivity's impact on manufacturing growth with that of the United States. Second, it would be of interest to re-consider this analysis in a contemporary setting. For instance, states with a greater proclivity towards aggressive enforcement likely prompt improved compliance and better environmental stewardship on the part of its existing manufacturing base. If a cap-and-trade policy is adopted, these manufacturing firms may find themselves with a competitive advantage in carbon trading which many provide opportunities. We leave these questions for future research. 
